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1.   Introduction 
A popular indicator of risk aversion in financial markets, the VIX index, shows strong 
co-movements with measures of the monetary policy stance. Figure 1 considers the cross-
correlogram between the real interest rate (the Fed funds rate minus inflation), a measure 
of the monetary policy stance, and the logarithm of end-of-month readings of the VIX 
index.  The  VIX  index  essentially  measures  the  “risk-neutral”  expected  stock  market 
variance  for  the  US  S&P500  index.  The  correlogram  reveals  a  very  strong  positive 
correlation between real interest rates and future VIX levels. While the current VIX is 
positively associated with future real rates, the relationship turns negative and significant 
after 13 months: high VIX readings are correlated with expansionary monetary policy in 
the medium-run future. 
The strong interaction between a “fear index” (Whaley (2000)) in the asset markets 
and  monetary  policy  indicators  may  have  important  implications  for  a  number  of 
literatures. First, the recent crisis has rekindled the idea that lax monetary policy can be 
conducive to financial instability. The Federal Reserve’s pattern of providing liquidity to 
financial markets following market tensions, which became known as the “Greenspan 
put,” has been cited as one of the contributing factors to the build-up of a speculative 
bubble prior to the 2007-09 financial crisis.
1 Whereas some rather informal stories have 
linked monetary policy to risk-taking in financial markets (Rajan (2006), Adrian and Shin 
                                                 
1 Investors increasingly believed that when market conditions were to deteriorate, the Fed would step in and 
inject liquidity until the outlook improved. Such perception may encourage excessive risk-taking and lead 
to higher valuations and narrower credit spreads. See, for example, “Greenspan Put may be Encouraging 
Complacency,” Financial Times, December 8, 2000.    2 
(2008), Borio and Zhu (2008)), it is fair to say that no extant research establishes a firm 
empirical link between monetary policy and risk aversion in asset markets.
2  
Second,  Bloom  (2009)  and  Bloom,  Floetotto  and  Jaimovich  (2009)  show  that 
heightened  “economic  uncertainty”  decreases  employment  and  output.  It  is  therefore 
conceivable that the monetary authority responds to uncertainty shocks, in order to affect 
economic  outcomes.  However,  the  VIX  index,  used  by  Bloom  (2009)  to  measure 
uncertainty,  can  be  decomposed  into  a  component  that reflects  actual  expected  stock 
market volatility (uncertainty) and a residual, the so-called variance premium (see, for 
example, Carr and Wu (2009)), that reflects risk aversion and other non-linear pricing 
effects, perhaps even Knightian uncertainty. Establishing which component drives the 
strong  co-movements  between  the  monetary  policy  stance  and  the  VIX  is  therefore 
particularly important.  
Third,  analyzing  the  relationship  between  monetary  policy  and  the  VIX  and  its 
components may help clarify the relationship between monetary policy and the stock 
market, explored in a large number of empirical papers (Thorbecke (1997), Rigobon and 
Sack (2004), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)). The extant studies all find that expansionary 
(contractionary)  monetary  policy  affects  the  stock  market  positively  (negatively). 
Interestingly,  Bernanke  and  Kuttner  (2005)  ascribe  the  bulk  of  the  effect  to  easier 
monetary policy lowering risk premiums, reflecting both a reduction in economic and 
financial volatility and an increase in the capacity of financial investors to bear risk. By 
using the VIX and its two components, we test the effect of monetary policy on stock 
market risk, but also provide more precise information on the exact channel.  
                                                 
2 For recent empirical evidence that monetary policy affects the riskiness of loans granted by banks see, for 
example,  Altunbas,  Gambacorta  and  Marquéz-Ibañez  (2010),  Ioannidou,  Ongena  and  Peydró  (2009), 
Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2009), and Maddaloni and Peydró (2010).    3 
This  article  characterizes  the  dynamic  links  between  risk  aversion,  economic 
uncertainty and monetary policy in a simple vector-autoregressive (VAR) system. Such 
analysis faces a number of difficulties. First, because risk aversion and the stance of 
monetary policy are jointly endogenous variables and display strong contemporaneous 
correlation  (see  Figure  1),  a  structural  interpretation  of  the  dynamic  effects  requires 
identifying restrictions. Monetary policy may indeed affect asset prices through its effect 
on risk aversion, as suggested by the literature on monetary policy news and the stock 
market, but monetary policy makers may also react to a nervous and uncertain market 
place  by  loosening  monetary  policy.  In  fact,  Rigobon  and  Sack  (2003)  find  that  the 
Federal Reserve does systematically respond to stock prices.
3 
Second, the relationship between risk aversion and monetary policy may also reflect 
the joint response to an omitted variable, with business cycle variation being a prime 
candidate.  Recessions  may  be  associated  with  high  risk  aversion  (see  Campbell  and 
Cochrane (1999) for a model generating counter-cyclical risk aversion) and at the same 
time lead to lax monetary policy. Our VARs always include a business cycle indicator. 
Third, measuring the monetary policy stance is the subject of a large literature (see, 
for example, Bernanke and Mihov (1998a)); and measuring policy shocks correctly is 
difficult. Models featuring time-varying risk aversion and/or uncertainty, such as Bekaert, 
Engstrom and Xing (2009), imply an equilibrium contemporaneous link between interest 
rates  and  risk  aversion  and  uncertainty,  through  precautionary  savings  effects  for 
example.  Such  relation  should  not  be  associated  with  a  policy  shock.  However,  our 
                                                 
3  The  two  papers  by  Rigobon  and  Sack  (2003,  2004)  use  an  identification  scheme  based  on  the 
heteroskedasticity  of  stock  market  returns.  Given  that  we  view  economic  uncertainty  as  an  important 
endogenous variable in its own right with links to the real economy and risk premiums, we cannot use such 
an identification scheme.   4 
results are robust to alternative measures of the monetary policy stance and of monetary 
policy shocks. In particular, the results are robust to identifying monetary policy shocks 
using a standard structural VAR, high frequency Fed funds futures changes following 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005), and monthly surprises based on the daily Fed 
funds futures following the approach in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  Section  2,  we  detail  the 
measurement  of the key  variables in  the VAR, including monetary policy  indicators, 
monetary policy shocks and business cycle indicators. First and foremost, we provide 
intuition on how the VIX is related to the actual expected variance of stock returns and to 
risk preferences. While the literature has proposed a number of risk appetite measures 
(see  Baker  and  Wurgler  (2007)  and  Coudert  and  Gex  (2008)),  our  measure  is 
monotonically  increasing  in  risk  aversion  in  a  variety  of  economic  settings.  This 
motivates  our  empirical  strategy  in  which  we  split  the  VIX  into  a  pure  volatility 
component (“uncertainty”) and a residual, which should be more closely associated with 
risk aversion. In Section 3, we analyze the dynamic relationship between monetary policy 
and risk aversion and uncertainty in standard structural VARs. The results are remarkably 
robust to a long list of robustness checks with respect to VAR specification, variable 
definitions and alternative identification methods. In Section 4, we use two alternative 
methods to identify monetary policy shocks relying on Fed futures data.  
Our main findings are as follows. A lax monetary policy decreases risk aversion in 
the stock market after about nine months. This effect is persistent, lasting for more than 
two years. Moreover, monetary policy shocks account for a significant proportion of the 
variance of risk aversion. The effects of monetary policy on uncertainty are similar but   5 
somewhat weaker. On the other hand, periods of both high uncertainty and high risk 
aversion are followed by a looser monetary policy stance but these results are less robust 
and much weaker statistically. Finally, it is the uncertainty component of the VIX that has 
the statistically stronger effect on the business cycle, not the risk aversion component.  
2.   Measurement 
This section details the measurement of the key inputs to our analysis: risk aversion 
and uncertainty; the monetary policy stance and monetary policy shocks; and finally, 
business cycle variation. Our data start in January 1990 (the start of the model-free VIX 
series) but we perform our analysis using two different end-points for the sample: July 
2007, yielding a sample that excludes recent data on the crisis; and August 2010. The 
crisis  period  presents  special  challenges  as  stock  market  volatilities  peaked  at 
unprecedented levels and the Fed funds target rate reached the zero lower bound. We 
detail how we address these challenges below. Table 1 describes the basic variables we 
use and assigns them a short-hand label. 
2.1   Measuring Risk Aversion and Uncertainty 
To measure risk aversion and uncertainty, we use a decomposition of the VIX index. 
The VIX represents the option-implied expected volatility on the S&P500 index with a 
horizon of 30 calendar days (22 trading days). This volatility concept is often referred to 
as “implied volatility” or “risk-neutral volatility,” as opposed to the actual (or “physical”) 
expected volatility. Intuitively, in a discrete state economy, the physical volatility would 
use the actual state probabilities to arrive at the physical expected variance, whereas the 
risk-neutral variance would make use of probabilities that are adjusted for the pricing of 
risk.    6 
The computation of the actual VIX index relies on theoretical results showing that 
option prices can be used to replicate any bounded payoff pattern; in fact, they can be 
used to replicate Arrow-Debreu securities (Breeden and Litzenberger (1978), Bakshi and 
Madan (2000)). Britten-Jones and Neuberger (2000) and Bakshi, Kapadia and Madan 
(2003) show how to infer “risk-neutral” expected volatility for a stock index from option 
prices. The VIX index measures implied volatility using a weighted average of European-
style S&P500 call and put option prices that straddle a 30-day maturity and cover a wide 
range of strikes (see CBOE (2004) for more details). Importantly, this estimate is model-
free and does not rely on an option pricing model. 
While the VIX obviously reflects stock market uncertainty, it conceptually must also 
harbor information about risk and risk aversion. Indeed, financial markets often view the 
VIX as a measure of risk aversion and fear in the market place. Because there are well-
accepted techniques to measure the physical expected variance, we can split the VIX into 
a measure of stock market or economic uncertainty, and a residual that should be more 
closely associated with risk aversion. The difference between the squared VIX and an 
estimate of the conditional variance is typically called the variance premium (see, e.g., 
Carr  and  Wu  (2009)).
4  The  variance  premium  is  nearly  always  positive
  and  displays 
substantial  time-variation.  Recent  finance  models  attribute  these  facts  either  to  non-
Gaussian components in fundamentals and (stochastic) risk aversion (see, for instance, 
Bekaert  and  Engstrom  (2010),  Bollerslev,  Tauchen  and  Zhou  (2009),  Drechsler  and 
Yaron (2011)) or Knightian uncertainty (see Drechsler (2009)). In the Appendix, we use 
a one-period discrete economy with power utility to illustrate the difference between 
                                                 
4 In the technical finance literature, the variance premium is actually the negative of the variable that we 
use.  By  switching  the  sign,  our  indicator  increases  with  risk  aversion,  whereas  the  variance  premium 
becomes more negative with risk aversion.    7 
“risk  neutral”  and  “physical”  expected  volatility  and  demonstrate  that  the  variance 
premium is indeed increasing in risk aversion. 
To decompose the VIX index into a risk aversion and an uncertainty component, we 
first estimate the expected future realized variance. It is customary in the literature to do 
so by projecting future realized monthly variances (computed using squared 5-minute 
returns) onto a set of current instruments. We follow this approach using daily data on 
monthly realized variances, the squared VIX, the dividend yield and the real three-month 
T-bill rate. By using daily data, we gain considerable statistical power relative to the 
standard  methods  employing  end-of-month  data.  For  example,  forecasting  models 
estimated from daily data easily “beat” models using only end-of-month data, even for 
end-of-month samples. 
To select a good forecasting model, we conduct a horserace between a total of eight 
volatility forecasting models. The first five models use OLS regressions with different 
predictors: a one-variable model with either the past realized variance or the squared 
VIX; a two-variable model with both the squared VIX and the past realized variance; a 
three-variable model adding the past dividend yield; and a four-variable model adding the 
past  real  three-month  T-bill  rate.  We  also  consider  three  models  that  do  not  require 
estimation: half-half weights on the past squared VIX and past realized variance; the past 
realized variance; the past squared VIX. We consider two model selection criteria: out-
of-sample  root-mean-squared  error  and  mean  absolute  errors,  and,  for  the  estimated 
models, stability (especially through the crisis period).  
This procedure leads us to select a two-variable model where the squared VIX and the 
past  realized  variance  are  used  as  predictors.  The  performance  of  the  three  and  four   8 
variable models is very comparable to this model, but the univariate estimated models 
and the non-estimated models perform consistently and significantly worse. Moreover, 
the model that we selected is the most stable of the well-performing forecasting models 
we considered, with the coefficients economically and statistically unaltered during the 
crisis  period.  In  the  online  Appendix,  we  give  a  detailed  account  of  the  forecasting 
horserace. The resulting coefficients from the two-variable projection are as follows:
5 
RVARt=-0.00002 + 0.299 VIX
2
t-22 + 0.442 RVARt-22+et             (1) 
  (0.00012)  (0.067)               (0.130) 
The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for serial correlation using 30 
Newey-West (1987) lags. 
The fitted value from the two-variable projection is the estimated physical expected 
variance (“uncertainty”). We use the logarithm of this estimate in our analysis and label it 
UC.  We  call  the  difference  between  the  squared  VIX  and  UC  “risk  aversion”  (the 
logarithm of which is labeled as RA). We plot the risk aversion and uncertainty estimates 
in Figure 2, along with 90% confidence intervals.
6 To construct the confidence bounds, 
we retain the coefficients from the forecasting projection together with their asymptotic 
covariance  matrix.  We  then  draw  100  alternative  parameter  coefficients  from  the 
distribution  of  these  estimates,  which  generates  alternative  RA  and  UC  estimates.  In 
Section 3.2.4, we use these bootstrapped series to account for the sampling error in the 
risk aversion and uncertainty estimates in our VARs. 
2.2   Measuring Monetary Policy 
                                                 
5  This  estimation  was  conducted  using  a  winsorized  sample  but  the  estimation  results  for  the  non-
winsorized sample are in fact very similar. 
6 The estimated uncertainty series is less “jaggedy” than it would be if only the past realized variance would 
be used to compute it (as in Bollerslev, Tauchen and Zhou, 2009), which in turn helps smooth the risk 
aversion process.   9 
To measure the monetary policy stance, we use the real interest rate (RERA), i.e., the 
Fed funds end-of-the-month target rate minus the CPI annual inflation rate. In Section 
3.2.1, we consider alternative measures of the monetary policy stance for robustness. Our 
first such measure is the Taylor rule residual, the difference between the nominal Fed 
funds rate and the Taylor rule rate (TR rate). The TR rate is estimated as in Taylor 
(1993): 
TRt = Inft + NatRatet + 0.5 (Inft - TargInf) + 0.5 OGt              (2) 
where  Inf  is  the  annual  inflation  rate,  NatRate  is  the  “natural”  real  Fed  funds  rate 
(consistent with full employment), which Taylor assumed to be 2%, TargInf is a target 
inflation rate, also assumed to be 2%, and OG (output gap) is the percentage deviation of 
real GDP from potential GDP; with the latter obtained from the Congressional Budget 
Office. As other alternative measures of the monetary policy stance, we consider the 
nominal Fed funds rate instead of the real rate, and (the growth rate of) the monetary 
aggregate M1, which is commonly assumed to be under tight control of the central bank. 
We  multiply  M1  (growth)  by  minus  one  so  that  a  positive  shock  to  this  variable 
corresponds to monetary policy tightening, in line with all other measures of monetary 
policy we use. 
Measuring the monetary policy stance is challenging since late 2008, as the Fed funds 
rate reached the zero lower bound (the Fed funds target was set in the range 0-0.25% as 
of December 2008) and the Federal Reserve turned to unconventional monetary policies, 
such as large-scale asset purchases. We approximate the “true” nominal Fed funds rate in 
the  period  December  2008  -  August  2010  by  taking  it  to  be  the  minimum  between 
0.125%  (i.e.,  the  mid-point  of  the  0-0.25%  range)  and  the  TR  rate,  estimated  using   10 
equation (2) above. Rudebusch (2009) has also advocated using the TR rate estimate as a 
proxy for the “true” Fed funds rate post-2008. 
In our analysis in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we use monetary policy surprises derived 
from  Fed  funds  futures  data.  In  Section  4.1,  we  rely  on  monetary  policy  surprises 
proposed by Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005), henceforth GSS.
7 GSS compute the 
monetary  policy  surprises  as  high-frequency  changes  in  the  futures  rate  around  the 
FOMC  announcements.  Their  “tight”  (“wide”)  window  estimates  begin  ten  (fifteen) 
minutes prior to the monetary policy announcement and end twenty (forty-five) minutes 
after the policy announcement, respectively. The data span the period from January 1990 
through June 2008. In Section 4.2, we use the unexpected change in the Fed funds rate on 
a monthly basis, defined as the average Fed funds target rate in month t minus the one-
month futures rate on the last day of the month t-1. This approach follows Kuttner (2001) 
and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) (henceforth BK); see their equation (5). As pointed out 
by BK, rate changes that were unanticipated as of the end of the prior month may well 
include  a  systematic  response  to  economic  news,  such  as  employment,  output  and 
inflation occurring during the month. To overcome this problem, we calculate “cleansed” 
monetary  surprises  that  are  orthogonal  to  a  set  of  economic  data  releases.  They  are 
calculated as residuals in a regression of the “simple” monetary policy surprise, onto the 
unexpected  component  of  the  industrial  production  index,  the  Institute  of  Supply 
Management  Purchasing  Managers  Index  (the  ISM  index),  the  payroll  survey,  and 
unemployment (see Section 2.3 below for a description). Finally, in the regression, we 
allow for heterogeneous coefficients before and after 1994, to take into account a change 
in the reaction of the Fed to economic data releases, as documented in BK. 
                                                 
7 We are very grateful to R. Gürkaynak for sharing the data with us.   11 
To extend the sample of monetary policy surprises until August 2010, we proceed in 
two steps. First, we collect data on monetary policy surprises at the zero lower bound 
from Wright (2011, Table 5). The surprises are based on a structural VAR in financial 
variables at the daily frequency, starting in November 2008 (and calculated beyond the 
end of our sample in August 2010). The shocks are positive (negative) when monetary 
policy is unexpectedly accommodative (restrictive). They also have a standard deviation 
equal to one by construction. For comparability with the GSS data, we rescale Wright’s 
shocks by multiplying them by minus the standard deviation of the GSS’s shocks, before 
appending them to the time series of GSS shocks. Second, to fill the gap between the data 
from  GSS  (June  2008)  and  Wright  (November  2008),  we  calculate  monetary  policy 
surprises using Federal funds futures, following BK. 
2.3   Measuring Business Cycle Variation 
We use industrial production as our benchmark indicator of business cycle variation 
at the monthly frequency. In a robustness exercise in Section 3.2.2, we also consider non-
farm employment and the ISM index as alternative business cycle indicators. 
In  Sections  4.1  and  4.2,  we  use  data  on  economic  news  surprises  following  the 
methodology in Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004).
8 In our analysis, we rely on unexpected 
components of news about the industrial production index, the ISM index, the payroll 
survey,  and  unemployment.  The  unexpected  component  of  each  news  release  is 
calculated  as  the  difference  between  the  released  data  and  the  median  expectation 
according to surveys. We use the Money Market Survey (MMS) for the period 1990-
2001 and Bloomberg for the period 2002-2010. The shocks are standardized over the 
sample period. 
                                                 
8 We are very grateful to M. Ehrmann and M. Fratzscher for sharing their dataset with us.   12 
3.   Structural Monetary VARs 
In this Section, we follow the identified monetary VAR literature and interpret the 
shock in the monetary policy equation as the monetary policy shock. Our benchmark 
VAR,  analyzed  in  Section  3.1,  consists  of  four-variables:  our  risk  aversion  and 
uncertainty proxies (rat and uct), the real interest rate as a measure of monetary policy 
stance (mpt), and the log-difference of industrial production as a business cycle indicator 
(bct). We consider alternative VARs as part of an extensive series of robustness checks 
discussed in Section 3.2.  The business cycle is the most important control variable as it is 
conceivable  that,  for  example,  news  indicating  weaker  than  expected  growth  in  the 
economy may simultaneously make a cut in the Fed funds target rate more likely and 
cause people to be effectively more risk averse, because their consumption moves closer 
to their “habit stock,” or because they fear a more uncertain future.  
3.1   Structural Four-Variable VAR 
We collect the four variables of our benchmark VAR in the vector Zt = [bct, mpt, rat 
uct]'. Without loss of generality, we ignore constants. Consider the following structural 
VAR: 
A Zt = Φ Zt-1 + εt                          (3) 
where A is a 4x4 full-rank matrix and E[εt εt'] = I. Of main interest are the dynamic 
responses to the structural shocks εt. Of course, we start by estimating the reduced-form 
VAR: 
Zt = B Zt-1 + C εt                          (4) 
where B denotes A
-1 Φ and C denotes A
-1. Our estimated VARs include 3 lags. In the 
Online  Appendix,  we  include  a  table  with  some  key  reduced-form  VAR  statistics,   13 
showing that the Schwarz criterion selects a one-lag VAR, whereas the Akaike criterion 
selects three lags. Moreover, residual specification tests (Johansen, 1995) show that the 
VAR with 3 lags clearly eliminates all serial correlation in the residuals. 
We need 6 restrictions on the VAR to identify the system. Our first set of restrictions 
uses  a  standard  Cholesky  decomposition  of  the  estimate  of  the  variance-covariance 
matrix. We order the business cycle variable first, followed by the real interest rate, with 
risk aversion and uncertainty ordered last. This captures the fact that risk aversion and 
uncertainty, stock market based variables, respond instantly to monetary policy shocks, 
while  the  business  cycle  variable  is  relatively  more  slow-moving.  Effectively,  this 
imposes six exclusion restrictions on the contemporaneous matrix A, making it lower-
triangular. 
Our  second  set  of  restrictions  combines  five  contemporaneous  restrictions  (also 
imposed under the Cholesky decomposition above) with the assumption that monetary 
policy  has  no  long-run  effect  on  the  level  of  industrial  production.  This  long-run 
restriction is inspired by the literature on long-run money neutrality: money should not 
have a long run effect on real variables.
9 Following Blanchard and Quah (1989), the 
model with a long-run restriction (LR) involves a long-run response matrix, denoted by 
D:  
D  (I - B)
-1 C.                         (5) 
The system with five contemporaneous restrictions and one long-run exclusion restriction 
corresponds to the following contemporaneous matrix A and long-run matrix D:
10 
                                                 
9 Bernanke and Mihov (1998b) and King and Watson (1992) marshal empirical evidence in favor of money 
neutrality using data on money growth and output growth. 
10  Both  identification  schemes  satisfy  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  global  identification  of 
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          (6) 
We  couch  our  main  results  in  the  form  of  impulse-response  functions  (IRFs 
henceforth),  estimated  in  the  usual  way,  and  focus  our  discussion  on  significant 
responses.  We  compute  90%  bootstrapped  confidence  intervals  based  on  1000 
replications. Figure 3 graphs the complete results for the pre-crisis sample but in our 
discussion  we  mention  the  corresponding  full  sample  (till  August  2010)  results  in 
parentheses. A complete graph for the full sample, mimicking Figure 3, is reproduced in 
the Online Appendix (Figure OA1). 
Panels A and B show the interactions between the real rate (RERA) and risk aversion 
(RA). A one standard deviation negative shock to the real rate, a 34 (42) basis points 
decrease under both identification schemes, lowers risk aversion by 0.032 (0.019) in the 
model  with  contemporaneous  restrictions  and  by  0.035  (0.019)  in  the  model  with 
contemporaneous/long-run  restrictions  after  9  (19)  months.  The  impact  reaches  a 
maximum of 0.056 (0.020) after 20 (23) months and remains significant up and till lag 40 
(40)  in  both  models.  So,  laxer  monetary  policy  lowers  risk  aversion  under  both 
identification schemes and in both the pre-crisis and full samples. The impact in the full 
sample is quantitatively weaker, and is only statistically significant at the 68% confidence 
level. However, such tighter confidence bounds are common in the VAR literature (see 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996), Sims and Zha (1999)). The impact of a one 
standard deviation positive shock to risk aversion, equivalent to 0.347 (0.363) on the real 
rate is mostly negative but not statistically significant in both models,   15 
As Panel C shows, a positive shock to the real rate increases uncertainty (UC) in the 
medium-run (after a short-lived negative impact), between lags 11 and 38 in the model 
with  contemporaneous  restrictions  and  between  lags  11  -  40  in  the  model  with 
contemporaneous/long-run restrictions. The maximum positive impact is 0.060 and 0.063 
at  lag  21  in  the  models  with  contemporaneous  and  contemporaneous/long-run 
restrictions, respectively (in the full sample, the max impact is 0.018 and it is borderline 
statistically  insignificant  even  at  the  68%  confidence  level).  In  the  other  direction, 
reported in Panel D, the real rate decreases in the short-run following a positive one 
standard deviation shock to uncertainty, equivalent to 0.244 (0.274). In both models, the 
impact  is  (borderline)  statistically  insignificant  in  the  pre-crisis  sample  (in  the  full 
sample, the impact is significant at the 90% confidence level between lags 7 and 47, 
reaching a maximum of 19 basis points at lag 18).  
As  for  interactions  with  the  business  cycle  variable  (Panels  E  through  J),  a 
contractionary monetary policy shock leads to a decline in industrial production growth 
(DIPI) in the medium-run, but the impact is statistically insignificant in all specifications. 
In the other direction, monetary policy reacts as expected to business cycle fluctuations: a 
one standard deviation positive shock to industrial production growth, equivalent to 0.005 
(0.006), leads  to  a  higher  real  rate.  Specifically,  in  the model with  contemporaneous 
restrictions, the real rate increases by a maximum of 14 (15) basis points after 6 (11) 
months, with the impact being significant between lags 1 and 20 (at lag 1, and between 
lags  3-31).  The  impact  is  also  positive  in  the  model  with  contemporaneous/long-run 
restrictions but it is not statistically significant. Interactions between risk aversion and 
industrial production  growth  are  mostly  statistically insignificant.  Positive uncertainty   16 
shocks lower industrial production growth between lags 6-15 (2-18), while the impact in 
the opposite direction is statistically insignificant. This is consistent with the analysis in 
Bloom (2009), who found that uncertainty shocks  generate significant business cycle 
effects, using the VIX as a measure of uncertainty.
11 
Finally, increases in risk aversion predict future increases in uncertainty under both 
identification schemes (Panel L). Uncertainty has a positive, albeit short-lived effect on 
risk aversion (Panel K).  
Our main result for the pre-crisis sample is that monetary policy has a medium-run 
statistically  significant  effect  on  risk  aversion.  This  effect  is  also  economically 
significant. In Figure 4, we show what fraction of the structural variance of the four 
variables in the VAR is due to monetary policy shocks. They account for over 20% of the 
variance of risk aversion at horizons longer than 37 and 29 months in the models with 
contemporaneous  and  contemporaneous/long-run  restrictions,  respectively.  Monetary 
policy shocks also increase uncertainty and Figure 4 shows that they are only marginally 
less  important  drivers  of  the  uncertainty  variance  than  they  are  of  the  risk  aversion 
variance. Finally, while monetary policy appears to relax policy in response to both risk 
aversion and uncertainty shocks, these effects are statistically weaker. 
The results for the full sample including the crisis period overall confirm our results 
for  the  pre-crisis  sample  but  are  less  statistically  significant.  Given  the  measurement 
problems mentioned before, and the rather extreme volatility the VIX experienced, this is 
not entirely surprising. 
                                                 
11 Popescu and Smets (2009) analyze the business cycle behavior of measures of perceived uncertainty and 
financial risk premia in Germany. They find that financial risk aversion shocks are more important in 
driving business cycles than uncertainty shocks. Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2011) document that innovations 
to the excess corporate bond premium, a proxy for the time-varying price of default risk, cause large and 
persistent contractions in economic activity.     17 
3.2   Robustness  
In this subsection, we consider five types of robustness checks: 1) measurement of the 
monetary policy stance; 2) measurement of the business cycle variable; 3) alternative 
orderings of variables; 4) accounting for the sampling error in RA and UC estimates; and 
5) conducting the analysis using a six variable monetary VAR with the Fed funds rate 
and price level measures CPI and PPI entering as separate variables. We also verified that 
our results remain robust to the use of both shorter and longer VAR lag-lengths. We 
estimated a VAR with 1 lag, as selected by the Schwarz criterion, as well as a VAR with 
4 lags (we did not go beyond four lags as otherwise the saturation ratio, the ratio of data 
points to parameters, drops below 10). Our results were unaltered.  
3.2.1   Measuring Monetary Policy 
Table 2 reports summary statistics on the interaction of alternative measures of the 
monetary policy stance with risk aversion (Panel A) and with uncertainty (Panel B). The 
results confirm that a looser monetary policy stance lowers risk aversion in the short to 
medium run. This effect is persistent, lasting for about two years. In some cases, the 
immediate effect has the reverse sign however. In the other direction, monetary policy 
becomes laxer in response to positive risk aversion shocks but the effect is statistically 
significant in less than half the cases. As for the effect of monetary policy on uncertainty, 
monetary  tightening  increases  uncertainty  in  the  medium  run  but  this  effect  is  not 
significant when using the Fed fund rate. In the other direction, higher uncertainty leads 
to laxer monetary policy in all specifications but the effect is only significant when using 
the Fed fund rate under contemporaneous identifying restrictions. 
3.2.2   Measuring Business Cycle Variation   18 
We  consider  the  log-difference  of  employment  and  the  log  of  the  ISM  index  as 
alternative business cycle indicators. Unlike industrial production and employment, the 
ISM index is a stationary variable, implying that VAR shocks do not have a long run 
effect on it. Our long-run restriction on the effect of monetary policy is thus stronger 
when applied to the ISM: it restricts the total effect of monetary policy on the ISM to be 
zero. Nevertheless, our main results from Section 3.1 are confirmed for each specification 
with an alternative business cycle variable. We present a full set of IRFs (the equivalent 
of Figure 3) for the VARs with the log-difference of employment and the log of the ISM 
index  as  business  cycle  measures  in  the  Online  Appendix  (Figures  OA4  and  OA5, 
respectively).  
3.2.3   Alternative Orderings of Variables 
In one alternative ordering, we reverse the order of risk aversion and uncertainty in 
our benchmark VAR. In another robustness check, we order the real interest rate last, 
thus allowing it to respond instantaneously to RA and UC shocks. We consistently find 
that  looser  monetary  policy  lowers  risk  aversion  and  uncertainty  in  a  statistically 
significant fashion in the medium-run. In the other direction, the effects are less robust. In 
the specification with RA and UC reversed,  monetary policy mostly responds to UC 
shocks, but the response to RA shocks is statistically insignificant. In the specification 
with RERA ordered last, monetary policy responds to both positive RA and UC shocks 
by loosening its stance, and the effect is statistically significantly different from zero. We 
present  a  full  set  of  IRFs  for  the  reversed  ordering  of  RA  and  UC  and  for  the 
specification with RERA ordered last in the Online Appendix (Figures OA6 and OA7, 
respectively).   19 
3.2.4   Sampling Error in RA and UC 
We check that our VAR results are robust to accounting for the sampling error in the 
RA and UC estimation. We draw 100 alternative RA and UC series from the distribution 
of  RA  and  UC  estimates  (as  described  in  section  2.1),  and  feed  those  into  our 
bootstrapped VAR. We estimate 100 VAR replications per set of alternative RA and UC 
series. We then construct the usual 90% confidence bounds. The results are very similar 
to  those  obtained  without  taking  uncertainty  surrounding  RA  and  UC  estimates  into 
account, and are presented in the Online Appendix (Figure OA8). 
3.2.5   Six-variable Monetary VAR 
We also estimate a six-variable monetary VAR following Christiano, Eichenbaum 
and Evans (1999) and featuring the nominal Fed funds rate as the measure of monetary 
policy stance and price level measures CPI and PPI as additional variables.
12 To identify 
monetary policy shocks, we use a Cholesky ordering with CPI and industrial production 
ordered first, followed by the Fed funds rate and PPI, and risk aversion and uncertainty 
ordered last.  
We  present  impulse-responses  to  monetary  policy  shocks  in  Figure  5.  Again,  we 
discuss  results  for  the  pre-crisis  sample,  but  summarize  the  full  sample  results  in 
parentheses. A positive monetary policy shock corresponds to a 15 basis points (30 in the 
full sample) increase in the Fed funds rate. A contractionary monetary shock leads to a 
statistically significant decrease in the CPI between lags 3 and 23 (2 and 8) and in the PPI 
between lags 23 and 50 (effect insignificant in the full sample). Furthermore, in the pre-
crisis sample, industrial production declines following a monetary contraction after about 
                                                 
12  We  estimate  the  model  with  four  lags,  as  suggested  by  the  Akaike  criterion.  All  variables  are  in 
logarithms except for the Fed funds rate. Note that industrial production now enters the VAR in levels.   20 
10  months,  though  the  effect  is  not  statistically  significant  (similarly,  the  effect  is 
insignificant  in  the  full  sample).  Importantly,  the  reactions  of  both  risk  aversion  and 
uncertainty are remarkably similar to those uncovered in our benchmark four-variable 
VARs. Looser monetary policy decreases risk aversion by 0.024 (0.023) after 12 (19) 
months. The effect reaches a maximum of 0.040 (0.025) at lag 23 (24), and remains 
statistically significant till lag 35 (till lag 37, significant under 68% confidence bounds). 
The effects remain economically important as monetary policy shocks account for over 
12% (3%) of the variance of risk aversion at horizons longer than 40 months (see Panel F 
of Figure 5) but these percentages are nonetheless lower than in our four-variable VAR. 
As for uncertainty, a higher Fed funds rate increases uncertainty between lags 12 and 31 
(16 and 36), with the maximum impact of 0.040 (0.033) at lag 23 (22), which is also 
consistent with our previous findings. In non-reported results, monetary policy responds 
to both positive RA and UC shocks by loosening its stance. The effect is statistically 
significant under 90% confidence bounds between lags 2 and 7 (6 and 15) for RA and 
between lags 5 and 26 (3 and 20) for UC.  
4.   Alternative Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks 
In this Section, we employ two alternative methodologies to identify monetary policy 
shocks: 1) monetary surprises based on high-frequency Fed funds futures and 2) monthly 
surprises calculated using daily Fed funds futures. 
4.1   Identification using High-Frequency Fed Funds Futures 
Our VAR set-up to identify monetary policy shocks and their structural relationship 
with risk aversion and uncertainty follows the Sims (1980, 1998) identification tradition. 
With  financial  market  values  changing  continuously  during  the  month,  the  use  of   21 
monthly  data  for  this  purpose  certainly  may  cast  some  doubt  on  this  identification 
scheme. We therefore use an alternative identification methodology that makes use of 
high frequency data to infer restrictions on the monthly VAR. The approach, inspired by 
and building on the procedure described in D’Amico and Farka (2011), consists of three 
steps. 
In the first step, we measure the structural monetary policy and business cycle shocks 
directly.  For  monetary  policy,  we  rely  on  a  well-established  literature  that  uses  high 
frequency  changes  in  Fed  funds  futures  rates  (see,  for  example,  Faust,  Swanson  and 
Wright, 2004) to measure monetary policy shocks, and we detailed their measurement in 
Section  2.  Likewise,  for  business  cycle  shocks,  we  use  news  announcements.  Under 
certain assumptions, these shocks can be viewed as measuring the structural shocks εt in 
the VAR. For monetary policy shocks, this is plausible because usually only one shock 
occurs  per  month,  and  the  use  of  high  frequency  futures  data  helps  ensure  that  the 
identified shock is plausibly orthogonal to other shocks. As to the business cycle shocks, 
there are a number of potentially important complicating issues, such as the correlation 
between the different news announcements and the structural shock to the actual business 
cycle variable used in the VAR, and the scale of the shocks when more than one occurs 
within  a  particular  month.  However,  these  issues  become  moot  when  business  cycle 
shocks do not generate significant contemporaneous effects on our financial variables, 
which ends up being the case.  
In the second step, we measure the high frequency effects of monetary policy and 
economic news surprises on risk aversion and uncertainty. We regress daily changes in 
risk  aversion  and  uncertainty  (as  proxies  for  unexpected  changes  to  these  variables),   22 
respectively, on the monetary policy surprises based on high-frequency futures (using the 
“tight”  window  shocks)
13  and  the  four  monthly  economic  news  surprises  concerning 
industrial production (ΔIP), the ISM index (ΔISM), non-farm payroll and employment 
(ΔEMP), as described in Section 2.3.
14 The resulting coefficients for the pre-crisis sample 
(with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses) are as follows: 
ΔRAt = -0.039 + 0.047 ΔMPt – 0.005 ΔIPt – 0.004 ΔISMt – 0.004 ΔEMPt          (7) 
            (0.007)   (0.020)           (0.014)          (0.016)            (0.017) 
ΔUCt = -0.009 + 0.013 ΔMPt + 0.002 ΔIPt – 0.002 ΔISMt – 0.008 ΔEMPt          (8) 
            (0.003)   (0.010)           (0.005)          (0.005)            (0.011) 
The coefficients on the business cycle news surprises are not statistically different 
from  zero  and  economically  small.  However,  the  responses  to  the  monetary  policy 
surprises are quantitatively larger and statistically significant at the 5% level for RA and 
at  the  16%  level  for  UC.  The  coefficients  on  ΔMP  give  us  direct  evidence  on  the 
contemporaneous responses of RA and UC to structural disturbances in MP. We already 
note that these responses confirm that risk aversion reacts positively to monetary policy 
shocks and does so more strongly than uncertainty. By the same token, we conclude that 
the contemporaneous responses of RA and UC to a business cycle shock in our VARs are 
equal to zero.  
In  the  third  step,  we  use  the  estimates  of  structural  responses  of  RA  and  UC  to 
monetary policy and business cycle shocks in our VAR analysis. This requires a number 
of additional assumptions. In particular, we assume that there are no further policy or 
business cycle shocks during the month and thus that the monthly shock equals the daily 
                                                 
13 Results for the monetary policy surprises calculated using the “wide” window are very similar.  
14 We treat both the non-farm payroll and the negative of the unemployment surprises as news about 
employment (ΔEMP) as they have similar information content. Whenever then come out on the same day 
(which is mostly the case), we sum them up.    23 
shock  identified  from  high  frequency  data.  Furthermore,  we  assume  that  the 
contemporaneous daily change in risk aversion and uncertainty identifies the monthly 
change in unexpected risk aversion and uncertainty due to these policy and business cycle 
shocks. In other words, we assume that the high-frequency regressions effectively yield 
four coefficients in the A
-1 matrix of our structural VAR. Because we need 6 restrictions 
in  total,  we  impose  two  more  restrictions  from  a  Cholesky  ordering  to  achieve 
identification. In one identification scheme (Model 1), we impose that both industrial 
production  and  monetary  policy  do  not  instantaneously  respond  to  RA;  in  another 
scheme, we impose the same restrictions on the reaction to UC (Model 2).
15 Because the 
identifying  assumptions  on  monetary  policy  shocks  have  more  support  in  the  extant 
literature than the assumptions we made regarding the business cycle shocks, we also 
consider  a  robustness  check  where  we  only  impose  the  high-frequency  responses  to 
monetary policy surprises in the monthly VAR. We then need four additional restrictions 
from a Cholesky ordering to complete identification and use the three contemporaneous 
restrictions in the BC equation (the usual assumption on sluggish adjustment of macro to 
financial data) and a zero response by monetary policy to either RA (Model 3) or UC 
(Model 4).  
For the full sample, all the estimated coefficients in the second step regressions are 
not statistically different from zero, but the effect of monetary policy shocks on risk 
aversion  is  again  positive  with  a  t-stat  of  close  to  1.  If  we  were  to  impose  that  the 
contemporaneous responses of RA and UC to monetary policy and business cycle shocks 
are all equal to zero, models 1 and 2 would be under-identified. We thus estimate only 
                                                 
15 Imposing zero-response restrictions to RA and UC in the BC equation would lead to an under-identified 
model.   24 
models 3 and 4 for the full sample, i.e., imposing the zero-response to monetary policy 
surprises from the second step regression, plus three contemporaneous restrictions in the 
BC equation and a zero response by monetary policy to either RA or UC. As before, we 
report  results  for  the  full  sample  in  parentheses  (and  present  IRFs  in  the  Online 
Appendix, Figure OA2).  
For the two models imposing four restrictions from the first step, we present impulse-
responses to monetary policy shocks in Figure 6. Looser monetary policy (corresponding 
to a 29 basis points decrease in the real rate) lowers risk aversion on impact and between 
lags 8 and 12, with a maximum impact of 0.055 in the model with no contemporaneous 
response of business cycle and monetary policy to RA. The maximum impact is 0.061 
and the effect is significant between lags 7 and 17 in the model with no contemporaneous 
response of business cycle and monetary policy to UC.  
As Panel B shows, a positive shock to the real rate increases uncertainty on impact in 
the model with no contemporaneous response of the business cycle and monetary policy 
to RA. The effect is positive but not statistically significant in the medium run. In the 
model with no contemporaneous response of business cycle and monetary policy to UC, 
the  positive  effect  of  the  real  rate  shock  on  uncertainty  is  statistically  significant  on 
impact and between lags 10-14, with a maximum impact of 0.059 at lag 14. 
Lastly,  the  impact  of  monetary  policy  on  industrial  production  growth  is  not 
statistically  significant  (Panel  C).  Note  that  with  different  measures  for  the  business 
cycle,  such  as  employment,  the  VAR  does  produce  the  expected  and  statistically 
significant response to monetary policy.   25 
For the two models imposing two restrictions (for the monetary policy shocks only) 
from the first step, we present impulse-responses to monetary policy shocks in Figure 7. 
Looser monetary policy, corresponding to a 33 (42) basis points decrease in the real rate, 
lowers  risk  aversion  on  impact  and  between  lags  4-36  (14-37,  significant  at  68% 
confidence bounds), with a maximum impact of 0.055 at lag 15 (0.023 at lag 17) both in 
the model with no contemporaneous response of monetary policy to RA and in the model 
with  no  contemporaneous  response  of  monetary  policy  to  UC  (and  the  three  zero 
restrictions in the BC equation). 
As Panel B shows, a positive shock to the real rate increases uncertainty on impact 
and between lags 4-36, with a maximum impact of 0.058 at lag 16 both in the model with 
no  contemporaneous  response  of  monetary  policy  to  RA  and  in  the  model  with  no 
contemporaneous response of monetary policy to UC (and the three zero restrictions in 
the BC equation). (The impact of the monetary policy shock on uncertainty is positive but 
not statistically significant at 68% confidence bounds for the full sample.) 
Lastly, the impact of monetary policy on industrial production growth is again not 
statistically significant (Panel C).  
4.2   Identification using Daily Fed Funds Futures 
In  this  section,  we  adopt  the  approach  of  Bernanke  and  Kuttner  (2005)  to  study  the 
dynamic response of risk aversion and uncertainty to monetary policy. The key feature of 
their approach is the calculation of a monthly monetary policy surprise using Federal 
funds futures contracts. This variable identifies the monetary policy shock and is included 
in the VAR as an exogenous variable. The endogenous variables in the VAR are RA, UC 
and the log difference of industrial production (DIPI).   26 
We present impulse-responses to “cleansed” monetary policy shocks
16 in Figure 7 for 
the pre-crisis sample and in the Online Appendix for the full sample (Figure OA3). As 
before, below we discuss results for the full sample in parentheses. The results generally 
confirm that monetary policy surprises have a positive impact on both RA and UC, and 
have the expected negative effect on industrial production. However, the results are less 
strong statistically than under our other identification schemes.  
A one standard deviation negative shock to the “cleansed” surprise, equivalent to 8.6 
basis  points  (9  basis  points),  decreases  RA  on  impact  by  0.061  and  UC  by  0.054 
(decreases RA by 0.053 and UC by 0.026). The IRFs are significant on impact at the 80% 
confidence level for RA and at the 70% level for UC (at the 80% level for RA; not 
statistically significant for UC). These results are robust to the use of alternative business 
cycle indicators (non-farm employment and the ISM index). 
5.   Conclusions 
A number of recent studies point at a potential link between loose monetary policy 
and excessive risk-taking in financial markets. Rajan (2006) conjectures that in times of 
ample liquidity supplied by the central bank, investment managers have a tendency to 
engage in risky, correlated investments. To earn excess returns in a low interest rate 
environment, their investment strategies may entail risky, tail-risk sensitive and illiquid 
securities (“search for yield”). Moreover, a tendency for herding behavior emerges due to 
the particular structure of managerial compensation contracts. Managers are evaluated 
vis-à-vis their peers and by pursuing strategies similar to others, they can ensure that they 
do not under perform. This “behavioral” channel of monetary policy transmission can 
                                                 
16 The monetary policy surprise is standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard 
deviation.   27 
lead to the formation of asset prices bubbles and can threaten financial stability. Yet, 
there is no empirical evidence on the links between risk aversion in financial markets and 
monetary policy.  
This article has attempted to provide a first characterization of the dynamic links 
between  risk,  uncertainty  and  monetary  policy,  using  a  simple  vector-autoregressive 
framework. We decompose implied volatility into two components, risk aversion and 
uncertainty, and study the interactions between each of the components and monetary 
policy  under  a  variety  of  identification  schemes  for  monetary  policy  shocks.  We 
consistently find that lax monetary policy increases risk appetite (decreases risk aversion) 
in the future, with the effect lasting for more than two years and starting to be significant 
after nine months. The effect on uncertainty is similar but the immediate response of 
uncertainty to monetary policy shocks in high frequency regressions is weaker than that 
of  risk  aversion.  Conversely,  high  uncertainty  and  high  risk  aversion  lead  to  laxer 
monetary  policy  in  the  near-term  future  but  these  effects  are  not  always  statistically 
significant.  These  results  are  robust  to  controlling  for  business  cycle  movements. 
Consequently,  our  VAR  analysis  provides  a  clean  interpretation  of  the  stylized  facts 
regarding  the  dynamic  relations  between  the  VIX  and  the  monetary  policy  stance 
depicted in Figure 1. The primary component driving the co-movement between past 
monetary policy stance and current VIX levels (first column of Figure 1) is risk aversion 
but uncertainty also reacts to monetary policy. Both components of the VIX lie behind 
the negative relation in the opposite direction (second column of Figure 1). 
We hope that our analysis will inspire further empirical work and research on the 
exact  theoretical  links  between  monetary  policy  and  risk-taking  behavior  in  asset   28 
markets. A recent literature, mostly focusing on the origins of the financial crisis, has 
considered a few channels that deserve further scrutiny. Adrian and Shin (2008) stress the 
balance sheets of financial intermediaries and repo growth; Adalid and Detken (2007) 
and Alessi and Detken (2008) stress the buildup of liquidity through money growth and 
Borio  and  Lowe  (2002)  emphasize  rapid  credit  expansion.
17  Recent  work  in  the 
consumption-based asset pricing literature attempts to understand the structural sources 
of the VIX dynamics (see Bekaert and Engstrom (2010), Bollerslev, Tauchen and Zhou 
(2009), Drechsler and Yaron (2011)). Yet, none of these models incorporates monetary 
policy equations. In macroeconomics, a number of articles have embedded term structure 
dynamics  into  the  standard  New-Keynesian  workhorse  model (Bekaert,  Cho, Moreno 
(2010),  Rudebusch  and  Wu  (2008)),  but  no  models  accommodate  the  dynamic 
interactions between monetary policy, risk aversion and uncertainty, uncovered in this 
article.  
The policy implications of our work are potentially very important. Because monetary 
policy significantly affects risk aversion  and uncertainty and these financial variables 
may  affect  the  business  cycle,  we  seem  to  have  uncovered  a  monetary  policy 
transmission  mechanism  missing  in  extant  macroeconomic  models.  Fed  chairman 
Bernanke (see Bernanke (2002)) interprets his work on the effect of monetary policy on 
the  stock  market  (Bernanke  and  Kuttner  (2005))  as  suggesting  that  monetary  policy 
would not have a sufficiently strong effect on asset markets to pop a “bubble” (see also 
Bernanke  and  Gertler  (2001),  Gilchrist  and  Leahy  (2002),  and  Greenspan  (2002)). 
                                                 
17 In fact, we considered the effects of repo, money and credit growth on our results by including them in a 
four-variable VAR together with RA, UC, and RERA (replacing the BC variable). We consistently found 
that the direct effect of monetary policy on risk aversion and uncertainty we uncovered in our benchmark 
VARs is preserved.   29 
However,  if  monetary  policy  significantly  affects  risk  appetite  in  asset  markets,  this 
conclusion  may  not  hold.  If  one  channel  is  that  lax  monetary  policy  induces  excess 
leverage as in Adrian and Shin (2008), perhaps monetary policy is potent enough to weed 
out  financial  excess.  Conversely,  in  times  of  crisis  and  heightened  risk  aversion, 
monetary policy can influence risk aversion and uncertainty in the market place, and 
therefore affect real outcomes. 
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Figure 1: Cross-correlogram LVIX RERA 
 
 
Notes: The first column presents the (lagged) cross-correlogram between the log of the VIX (LVIX) and 
past values of the real interest rate (RERA). The second column presents the (lead) cross-correlogram 
between LVIX and future values of RERA. Dashed vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals for the 
cross-correlation. The third column presents the cross-correlation values. The index i indicates the number 
of months either lagged or led for the real interest rate variable.   35 
 
Table 1: Description of variables 
Name  Label  Description (source) 
Consumer price index  CPI  Consumer price index, all items 
Dividend yield    Dividend yield of the Standard & Poor 500 
index  
Fed funds rate  FED  Fed funds target rate  
Implied volatility   LVIX  Implied volatility of options on the 
Standard & Poor 500 index, Log (VIX 
/ 12 ) 
(Growth of) Industrial production  (D)IPI  Log (difference of) total industrial 
production index 
ISM index  ISM  ISM Purchasing Managers index  
M1 money aggregate growth  M1  Month-on-month growth of M1  
(Growth of) Non-farm employment  (D)EMP  Log (difference of) non-farm employment  
Producer price index  PPI  Producer price index for intermediate 
materials 
Real interest rate  RERA  FED minus annual CPI inflation rate  
Realized variance  RVAR  Realized variance [see Section 2.1] 
Risk aversion  RA  Log (risk aversion) [see Section 2.1] 
Taylor Rule deviations  TRULE  FED minus Taylor rule rate [see Section 
2.2] 
Three-month T-bill    Secondary market yield 
Uncertainty (conditional variance)  UC  Log (uncertainty) [see Section 2.1] 
 
Notes: Monthly frequency, end-of-the-month data (seasonally adjusted where applicable). Unless otherwise 
mentioned, the data are from Thomson Datastream.   36 
 
Figure 2: Risk aversion and uncertainty 




















































































































































































































































































































Notes: Plots of risk aversion and uncertainty for our sample period (January 1990 – August 2010).    37 
  
 
Figure 3: Structural-form IRFs for the 4-variable VAR (DIPI, RERA, RA, UC) 
 
Panel A: Impulse RERA, response RA 





Panel B: Impulse RA, response RERA 





Panel C: Impulse RERA, response UC 





Panel D: Impulse UC, response RERA 
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Panel E: Impulse RERA, response DIPI 





Panel F: Impulse DIPI, response RERA 





Panel G: Impulse RA, response DIPI 





Panel H: Impulse DIPI, response RA 
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Panel I: Impulse UC, response DIPI 





Panel J: Impulse DIPI, response UC 





Panel K: Impulse RA, response UC 





Panel L: Impulse UC, response RA 







Notes:  Estimated  structural  impulse-response  functions (black  lines)  and 90%  bootstrapped  confidence 
intervals (grey dashed lines) for the model with 3 lags (selected by Akaike), based on 1000 replications. 
Panels on the left present results of the model with contemporaneous (Cholesky) restrictions, panels on the 
right present results of the model with contemporaneous/long-run restrictions.   40 
 
Figure 4: Structural variance decompositions 
Impact of RERA shocks 






Notes: Fractions of the structural variance due to RERA shocks for the four variables DIPI, RERA, RA and 
UC (model with 3 lags, selected by Akaike). The panel on the left presents results of the model with 
contemporaneous  restrictions,  the  panel  on  the  right  presents  results  of  the  model  with 
contemporaneous/long-run restrictions.   41 
Table 2: Robustness to monetary policy measures 
Panel A: Monetary policy instrument – risk aversion pair 
MP instrument  Impulse MP, response RA  Impulse RA, response MP 
  sign  significant from-to (month)  sign  significant from-to (month) 







0 - 2 (), 9 - 40 (+) 
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Panel B: Monetary policy instrument – uncertainty pair 
MP instrument  Impulse MP, response UC  Impulse UC, response MP 
  sign  significant from-to (month)  sign  significant from-to (month) 







0 - 1 (), 11 - 38 (+) 














0 - 1 (), 15 - 42 (+) 
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Notes: Table 4 summarizes results for the interactions between monetary policy (as represented by four 
different measures) and risk aversion (RA) in Panel A and between monetary policy and uncertainty (UC) 
in panel B in the four-variable model with DIPI, MP, RA and UC. The MP measures considered are: real 
rate, Taylor rule deviations, Fed funds rate, the negative of the M1 growth. Each Panel lists the range of 
months  for  which  impulse-response  functions  (VARs  with  contemporaneous  (COR)  and 
contemporaneous/long-run (CLR) restrictions, respectively) were statistically significant within the 90% 
confidence interval in the direction indicated in the column “sign”. The last row in each panel considers a 
specification with M1 and industrial production both entering in levels rather than growth rates (COR 
restrictions only).   42 
Figure 5: Monetary policy shock in the 6-variable VAR (CPI EMP FED PPI RA UC) 
 
Panel A: Impulse FED, response CPI  Panel B: Impulse FED, response PPI 
   
Panel C: Impulse FED, response RA  Panel D: Impulse FED, response UC 
   
Panel E: Impulse FED, response IPI  Panel F: Structural Variance Decompositions 
 
 
Notes: Panels A-E: Estimated structural impulse-responses (black lines) to a monetary policy shock in the 
6-variable model and 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals (dashed grey lines), for the model with 4 lags 
(selected by Akaike), based on 1000 replications. Panel F: Fractions of the structural variance due to FED 
shocks for the six variables.   43 
Figure 6: Identification using high-frequency futures and business cycle news 
announcements 
 
Panel A: Impulse MP, response RA 





Panel B: Impulse MP, response UC 





Panel C: Impulse MP, response DIPI 






Notes:  Estimated  structural  impulse-response  functions (black  lines)  and 90% bootstrapped  confidence 
intervals (grey dashed lines) for the model with 3 lags (selected by), based on 1000 replications. Four 
restrictions are derived from high frequency data. Panels on the left present results of Model 1 (BC and MP 
do not respond instantaneously to RA), panels on the right present results of Model 2 (BC and MP do not 
respond instantaneously to UC).   44 
Figure 7: Identification using high-frequency futures 
 
Panel A: Impulse MP, response RA 





Panel B: Impulse MP, response UC 





Panel C: Impulse MP, response DIPI 






Notes:  Estimated  structural  impulse-response  functions (black  lines)  and 90% bootstrapped  confidence 
intervals (grey dashed lines) for the model with 3 lags (selected by), based on 1000 replications. Panels on 
the left present results of Model 3, panels on the right present results of Model 4. Both models assume zero 
contemporaneous responses of the BC shocks to the other variables. Model 3 (Model 4) assumes that 
monetary policy does not instantaneously react to RA (UC).   45 
 
Figure 8: Identification using daily futures 
 
Panel A: Impulse MP, response RA  Panel B: Impulse MP, response UC 
   




Notes:  Estimated  impulse-response  functions  to  “cleansed”  MP  surprise  (black  lines)  and  90% 
bootstrapped confidence intervals (grey dashed lines).   46 
 
 
Appendix: The VIX and Risk 
To obtain intuition on how the VIX is related to the actual (“physical”) expected 
variance of stock returns and to risk preferences, we analyze a one-period discrete state 
economy. Imagine a stock return distribution with three different states i x , as follows: 
Good state:  a xg     with probability  2 / ) 1 ( p  , 
Bad state :  a xb     with probability  2 / ) 1 ( p  , 
Crash state:  c xc   with probability  p , 
where  0   ,  0  a  and  0  p  are parameters to be determined. We set them to match 
moments  of  US  stock  returns  -  the  mean,  the  variance  (standard  deviation)  and  the 
skewness - while fixing the crash return at an empirically plausible number. 
The mean is given by:  













.               (1) 
The variance is given by: 














                (2) 
and the skewness (Sk ) by: 
3 3 3 2
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   .           (3) 
Consider an investor with power utility over wealth in a one-period world, so that in 





















E W U ,                     (4) 
where  R
~
  is  the  gross  return  on the stock market,  0 W   is  initial wealth  and     is  the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion.  
The “pricing kernel” in this economy is given by marginal utility, denoted bym , and 
is proportional to 
  R
~
. Hence, the stochastic part of the pricing kernel moves inversely 
with the return on the stock market. When the stock market is down, marginal utility is 
relatively high and vice versa.    47 
The  physical  variance  of  the  stock  market  is  exogenous  in  this  economy,  and  is 
simply given byV . This variance is computed using the actual probabilities. The VIX 
represents  the  “risk-neutral”  conditional  variance.  It  is  computed  using  the  so-called 
“risk-neutral probabilities,” which are simply probabilities adjusted for risk.  
In particular, for a general state probability  i   for state i , the risk-neutral probability 
is: 












  .                     (5) 
So, for a given , we can easily compute the risk-neutral probabilities since  1   i i x R . 
For an economy with K  states, the risk-neutral variance is then given by: 
2
1






                      (6) 
and the variance premium is: 
2
1





i      

  .                 (7) 
In our economy, the risk-neutral probability puts more weight on the crash state and 
the crash state induces plenty of additional variance, rendering the variance premium 
positive. The higher is risk aversion, the more weight the crash state gets, and the higher 
the variance premium will be. The expression for the variance premium has a particularly 
simple form:  
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Suppose the statistics to match are as follows:  % 10  X ,  % 15   , both on an 
annualized basis; and  1   Sk on a monthly basis. We set  % 25   c  (a monthly number). 
This crash return is in line with the stock market collapses in October 1987 and October 
2008. The implied crash probability to match the skewness coefficient of  -1 is given 
by %   5 . 0  p . With a monthly investment horizon, the crash probability implies a crash 
every 200 months, or roughly once every two decades. Panel A of Appendix Table 1   48 
provides, for different values of the coefficient of relative risk aversion  , the values for 
the VIX on an annualized basis in percent (VIX), the log of the VIX on a monthly basis 
(LVIX),  i.e.,  log(VIX 12 / ),  the  annualized  variance  premium  (VP),  and  our  risk 
aversion proxy computed on a monthly basis (RA), i.e., log(VIX 12 / 12 /
2 2   ). Note 
that the variance premium and our risk aversion measure are monotonically increasing in 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion  .  
In  structural  models,     is  typically  assumed  to  be  time-invariant,  and  the  time 
variation  in  the  variance  premium  is  generated  through  different  mechanisms.  For 
example,  in  Drechsler  and  Yaron  (2011),  who  formulate  a  consumption-based  asset 
pricing model with recursive preferences, the variance premium is directly linked to the 
probability  of  a  “negative  jump”  to  expected  consumption  growth.  The  analogous 
mechanism  in  our  simple  economy  would  be  to  decrease  the  skewness  of  the  return 
distribution  by  increasing  the  crash  probability  p .  This  obviously  represents  “risk” 
instead of “risk aversion”. Yet, it is the interaction of risk aversion and skewness that 
gives rise to large readings in our risk aversion proxy. To illustrate, let us consider an 
example  with  lower  skewness.  Setting  skewness  equal  to  -2  requires  a  higher  crash 
probability of  %   1  p . Panel B of Appendix Table 1 shows that the VIX increases, and 
increases more the higher the coefficient of relative risk aversion, both in absolute and in 
relative terms. The variance premium roughly doubles for all   levels, whereas our risk 
aversion proxy increases by about 0.7. 
In  Bekaert  and  Engstrom  (2010),  when  a  recession  becomes  more  likely,  the 
representative  agent  also  becomes  more  risk  averse  through  a  Campbell-Cochrane 
(1999)-like external habit formulation. The recession fear then induces high levels of the 
VIX. We can informally illustrate such a mechanism in our one-period model. Imagine 
that the utility function is over wealth relative to an exogenous benchmark wealth level 
bm W .  Normalizing  the  initial  wealth  0 W   to  1,  the  pricing  kernel  is  now  given  by 
 
 
 bm W R
~




 . Consequently, 
risk aversion is state dependent and increases as  R
~
 decreases towards the benchmark 
level. It is easy to see how a dynamic version of this economy, for instance with a slow-  49 
moving  bm W ,  could  generate  risk  aversion  that  is  changing  over  time  as  return 
realizations change the distance between actual wealth and the benchmark wealth level.  
To illustrate this mechanism, Panel C considers three different benchmark levels for 
bm W   (0.05,  0.25  and  0.5)  with     fixed  at  4  and  1   Sk ,  implying  %   5 . 0  p .  The 
second column shows expected relative risk aversion in the economy (CRRA), weighting 
the three possible realizations for risk aversion with the actual state probabilities. The 
other  columns  are  as  in  the  panels  above.  Clearly,  for  0  bm W ,  CRRA  =  4  and  we 
replicate the values in Panel A for  4   . Keeping   fixed and increasing  bm W , effective 
risk aversion increases. For example, CRRA increases from 4.21 to 7.97 as  bm W  increases 
from 0.05 to 0.5. The VIX increases from 17.87 to 27.93 and our risk aversion proxy RA 
increases from 2.06 to 3.83. In sum, our risk aversion measure monotonically increases 
with true risk aversion in the underlying economy. 
Appendix Table 1: The VIX and Risk Aversion 
Panel A: Varying  ,  1   Sk ,  %   5 . 0  p  
Parameters  VIX  LVIX  VP  RA 
2 , 1     Sk   15.987  1.529  0.003  0.936 
4 , 1     Sk   17.612  1.626  0.008  1.960 
6 , 1     Sk   20.139  1.760  0.018  2.711 
Panel B: Varying  ,  2   Sk ,  %   1  p  
Parameters  VIX  LVIX  VP  RA 
2 , 2     Sk   16.908  1.585  0.006  1.624 
4 , 2     Sk   19.841  1.745  0.017  2.643 
6 , 2     Sk   24.075  1.939  0.036  3.386 
Panel C: Varying  bm W ,  4   ,  1   Sk ,  %   5 . 0  p  
Parameters  CRRA  VIX  LVIX  VP  RA 
     0 , 4   bm W    4.000  17.612  1.626  0.008  1.960 
05 . 0 , 4   bm W    4.209  17.868  1.641  0.009  2.061 
25 . 0 , 4   bm W    5.323  19.598  1.733  0.016  2.584 
50 . 0 , 4   bm W    7.968  27.934  2.087  0.056  3.835 
 
Notes: Values of the VIX on an annualized basis in percent (VIX), the log of the VIX on a monthly basis 
(LVIX), the annualized variance premium (VP), and our proxy for risk aversion on a monthly basis (RA) 
for different values of the underlying parameters, while keeping the crash return c fixed at -25%. In Panel 
A, the varying parameter is the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ while skewness Sk is fixed at -1. In 
Panel B, skewness Sk is fixed at -2. Panel C computes, for γ fixed at 4 and Sk fixed at -1, expected risk 
aversion (CRRA) and the other four variables for different values of the benchmark wealth level Wbm.  
 